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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO PRIMA FACIE VIOLATIONS
OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Francis C. Mayer*
There are two basic defenses to a prima facie violation of section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act.' The cost justification proviso of section 2(a)
represents an attempt by Congress not to penalize efficiency. It allows the
passing on of cost savings in the form of lower prices by the seller in the hope
that they will be translated to all competitive levels and ultimately to the con-
sumer. The cost proviso is probably a little more buyer oriented than seller
oriented. If a seller makes a predetermined effort to price his product with
relation to the cost factors involved and thereafter attempts to vary these prices
with relation to various classifications in which he places his customers, he has
a duty to make that known to all of his customers. This is necessary so that they
can, by their ingenuity or by changes in their own methods of distribution, avail
themselves of the different classifications being used by the seller and participate
in the lower price.
The meeting competition defense of section 2 (b)2 is quite differently oriented.
It allows the reaction of a seller in the face of a price raid by his competitors.
The low price may come about for a variety of reasons, e.g., better efficiencies
on the part of one seller or a particular seller thinking he has a private preserve
upon one market. All things being competitively equal, sometimes the very
assertion of the meeting competition defense in any formal action raises a ques-
tion as to which seller should have been sued in the first instance.
* Member, District of Columbia Bar; Ph.B., Regis College, 1940; LL.B., Catholic Univer-
sity of America Law School, 1947; Chief, Division of Discriminatory Trade Practices, Bureau
of Restraint of Trade, Federal Trade Commission. Mr. Mayer is the author of several articles
in the antitrust area. The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of
the Federal Trade Commission.
1 Section 2(a) of the act outlines the elements of prima facie violation as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course- of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the pur-
chases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are
sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or
the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction
of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ....
Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
2 Section 2(b) provides:
(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section,
that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the bur-
den of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon
the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be
affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the
discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a
seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the
furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or -facilities fur-
nished by a competitor.
Robinson-Patman Act § 2(b), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964).
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
I. Meeting Competition
In the old Clayton Act, the meeting competition defense was very broadly
stated.3 In the administration of the statute and in the cases brought under it,
the defense proved to be a major obstacle to the effective enforcement of the
statute. In 1936, the Robinson-Patman Arniendment4 attempted to close the
loophole created by the broad interpretation of the meeting competition defense.
The act provided that a seller could show that the lower price to one of his
purchasers "was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor."' In its origins this defense was considered by many to be procedural,
i.e., one which could be asserted by the seller and accepted or rejected by the
Commission or the courts, depending upon the competitive circumstances in
which it arose. That view was rejected by the Supreme Court in the Standard
Oil proceedings in which the Court held that the defense is not procedural
but substantive and a complete defense to any charge of price discrimination.6
Since 2(b) constitutes an absolute defense, the Commission and the courts must
insist upon a very high standard of proof when the defense is offered. If they
expand the areas of application of the 2(b) defense, they run the risk of defeating
the very purpose for which the statute was enacted.
There are two elements which are necessary to establish the 2(b) defense
successfully. First, the lower price must be given to meet an equally low price, and
second, the price discrimination must be a defensive reaction to an individual
competitive situation. The central inquiry to be made into any asserted 2(b)
defense is whether the seller was acting in good faith. The burden is upon the
seller to explain all of the circumstances surrounding the low price which it
believes compel it to discriminate between its own customers as a matter of
economic necessity.
Recently, the Commission has issued three opinions accepting the 2(b)
defense. In the Continental Baking decision' the Commission said that the
2(b) defense is an ad hoc principle which has to be judged in the particular
and peculiar circumstances of each case. The standard of good faith was de-
fined as "simply the standard of the prudent businessman responding fairly to
what he reasonably believes is a situation of ompetitive necessity." 8  Since
this language is invitingly broad, perhaps a discussion of some of the circum-
stances in which the case arose is in order.
For several years Continental had been faced with price cuts by its com-
petitors in favor of certain retail grocery stores. Its first reaction was to do
nothing, but in the course of two years its market position deteriorated. Con-
3 The original Clayton Act contained the following proviso:
[N]othing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price between pur-
chasers of commodities . . . that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost
of selling or transportation, or discrimination in price in the same or different com-
munities made in good faith to meet competition....
Clayton Act § 2, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
4 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
5 Robinson-Patman Act § 2(b), 49 Stat. 1526'(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964).
6 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
7 Continental Baking Co., 3 TRADE Ro. REP. 16720 (F.T.C. Dec. 31, 1963).
8 Id. at 21646.
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tinental investigated and discovered, with some degree of definiteness, who the
competitors were that were offering the prices and what those prices were.
Against that background Continental lowered its prices on an individual basis
in order to retain its customers. The Commission found -that the 2(b) defense
had been made out. I hope that with a little education some of the difficulties
with relation to the defense will be alleviated. They would certainly become so
if the sellers were a little more careful about documenting the circumstances in
which they felt they were compelled to lower their prices.
The Ponca case9 also dealt with a unique situation. Ponca, a cigarette
wholesaler, had granted discriminatory discounts to certain chain stores pur-
chasing cigarettes bearing the New Mexico tax stamp. Although Ponca's prices
to the chains were higher than those offered by cigarette manufacturers, the
chains preferred to buy from Ponca since Ponca performed the stamping function.
The testimony revealed that if Ponca had not quoted discriminatory lower prices,
the chains would have purchased from the manufacturers at even lower prices and
performed the stamping function themselves.'" This assertion was borne out by
later evidence which revealed that when Ponca ceased quoting discriminatory
prices to the chains, the latter discontinued purchasing from Ponca and began to
purchase from the manufacturers." In the light of these circumstances the
Commission sustained Ponca's 2 (b) defense.
Beatrice Foods2 is the most recent Commission decision sustaining the 2 (b)
defense. In Beatrice, respondent increased its discount to the Miller supermarket
chain from 7 percent to 10 percent on its primary brand milk and to 12 percent
on its private label milk. Testimonial and documentary evidence demonstrated
that respondent had been apprised of the exact terms of an offer of higher dis-
counts by a competitor (Fairmont) to the Miller chain prior to respondent's
decision to grant discriminatory discounts. It further revealed that respondent
had been advised by an official of the Miller chain that accepiance of the Fair-
mont offer would mean that respondent would no longer be serving the Miller
account. On the basis of these facts, the Commission, Chairman Dixon dissenting
and Commissioner MacIntyre not participating, concluded that respondent had
made a good faith response to a legitimate competitive challenge. In his dissent,
Chairman Dixon pointed out that the effect of the decision would be to allow
discriminatory lower prices to continue for an indefinite period of time regard-
less of the continuance of the competitive challenge. In the Chairman's view,
a seller asserting the 2(b) defense has a duty to verify the continuance of an
equally low price offer of a competitor in order to establish good faith.
Chairman Dixon's opinion makes sense in a very practical way. Customers
are injured by the continuation of individual discriminatory pricing which should
be excused only upon a showing that the necessity for the preference is still in
actual existence. The seller should have the obligation of looking into the situa-
tion periodically once it has discriminated to insure that its meeting competition
defense is still valid.
9 Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co., 3 TRADE R G. REP. 16814 (F.T.C. Feb. 24, 1964).
10 Id. at 21788-89.
11 Id. at 21790.
12 Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRAE REG. REP. 17311 (F.T.C. July 29, 1965).
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
In most of the recent Commission and court decisions respondents have
failed to meet the strict standards of proof imposed on sellers asserting-the 2(b)
defense. In Callaway Mills Co.,'" Callaway utilized a cumulative, annual volume
discount schedule which resulted in higher net prices to certain purchasers and
lower net prices to others. Callaway urged the 2(b) defense as justification for
the lower net prices to the favored purchasers, but its defense was rejected by
the Commission, Commissioner Elman dissenting.
First, it was apparent that Callaway's discriminatory pricing 'formula was
universal in its application. Therefore, the discriminatory lower prices granted
pursuant to that formula were not responsive to individual competitive situations,
a requirement promulgated by the Supreme Court in the Staley case.'4 Paren-
thetically, it may be noted that this limitation on the 2(b) defense imposed by
the Staley decision has been adopted by the Commission and the courts in cases
involving section 2(d) of the amended Clayton Act. In Exquisite Form Bras-
siere, Inc., 5 the Commission determined that Exquisite Form's cooperative
advertising plan was generally operative and that the discriminatory advertising
allowances paid pursuant to the plan were not designed to meet individual com-
petitive situations; consequently, the 2(b) defense was rejected. The Commis-
sion's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, which specifically observed that the limiting rule of the Staley case tis
applicable to advertising allowance discriminations violative of 2(d) as well as
price discriminations in violation of 2(a)."
Second, in Callaway, the Commission held -that the seller's failure to
produce evidence that the goods on which they were granting lower prices were
comparable in grade and quality to the goods being sold by competitors at
equally low or lower prices necessarily precluded a finding that the seller had
established the good faith defense.' In the Commission's view, such a showing
is essential in order to determine whether a seller's lower prices were granted
as a good faith response to the equally low price offers of competitors. For, as
the Commission observed, if the goods on which Callaway granted lower prices
were superior in grade and quality to the goods of competitors, Callaway, in effect,
would be undercutting competitors' prices, 'and therefore not acting in good
faith. 8 In the absence of such evidence in the Callaway case, the Commission
was unable to determine whether Callaway had acted in good faith, and the
2(b) defense was rejected. The Commission employed similar reasoning in
rejecting the 2(b) defense in a companion proceeding, Cabin Crafts, Inc.,9
and in Purolator Prods., Inc."
The reasoning of the Commission on this point is sound. Whether a product
13 Sub nom. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., 3 TRADE RUG. REP. 16800 '(F.T.C. Feb. 10,
1964).
14 FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
15 3 TRADE REG. RYP. 16753 (F.T.C. Jan. 20, 1964).
16 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) 71491
(D.C. Cir. July 2, 1965).
17 Sub nom. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., 3 TRADE RUG. REP. 16800, at 21755 (F.T.C.
Feb. 10, 1964).
18 Ibid.
19 3 TRADE RUG. REP. 16802 (F.T.C. Feb. 10, 1964).
20 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16877 (F.T.C. April 3, 1964).
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possesses a high degree of consumer acceptance due to brand advertising or
product characteristics and therefore demands a premium price is a factor which
should be considered in determining whether there has been a good faith meet-
ing of competition, rather than in determining whether there have been sales of
like grade and quality within the meaning of 2(a).21 Thus, where a seller of
a premium-priced product discriminates to meet the price of a seller marketing
a popularly priced product, exact price meeting may become undercutting and
make the prices suspect with relation to evaluating the defense.
In Forster Mfg. Co.,22 the Commission rejected the seller's 2(b) defense
on the ground, among others, that Forster failed to show that, prior to its granting
of discriminatory prices, it knew the identity of its competitors and the amount
of discounts offered by those competitors to the customers favored by Forster.
In the Commission's view, such a requirement was implicit in 2(b) itself and
in the statement of the Supreme Court construing that section in the Staley
case.2" The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, ruled that the
Commission's foreknowledge requirement was stricter than the test laid down
in Staley, and remanded the case to the Commission for a consideration of the
evidence in the light of the Staley rule.24 On remand, the Commission again
rejected the 2(b) defense.25 By way of dictum, the Commission stated that
they had not intended their original opinion to be interpreted to mean that a
seller had to produce "proof positive" as to the identity of competitors and the
exact amounts of their price offers. However, the Commission felt that sellers
have a duty to make diligent investigations of reported competitive price offers
before granting discriminatory prices in order to show good faith.
II. Cost Justification
The cost proviso contained in section 2(a)2" permits the justification of
price differentials stemming from cognizable differences in a seller's costs of
dealing with the purchasers paying the higher and lower prices. The topic
which has received the most attention in recent opinions of the courts and the
Commission involves the standards to be applied in grouping customers for
purposes of establishing cost-justifiable pricing categories.
The grouping of customers for purposes of pricing and averaging of costs
has been approved by the Supreme Court. 7 The Court took great pains, how-
ever, to warn that the line between different customer classes must be drawn
with great care:
21 Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916, 919-21 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
22 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16243 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 1963).
23 FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
24 Forster M.fg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964).
25 Forster Mfg. Co., 3 TRADE kEG. REP. 17304 (F.T.C. July 29, 1965).
26 The cost justification proviso of § 2(a) states:
[ . . Nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from
the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers
sold or delivered....
Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
27 United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
A balance is struck by the use of classes for cost justification which are
composed of members of such selfsameness as to make the averaging of
the cost of dealing with the group a valid and reasonable indicium of the
cost of dealing with any specific group member. High on the list of "musts"
in the use of the average cost of customer groupings under the proviso
of § 2(a) is a close resemblance of the individual members of each group
on the essential point or points which determine the costs considered. 28
In the Borden case itself, the customer groupings were not shown to have
"sufficient homogeneity" in terms of the cost factors considered, and therefore
were invalidated by the Court. Borden had attempted to differentiate its costs
of doing business with two chain stores on the one hand, and a number of
independent grocery stores on the other. However, the record indicated that
the cost savings attributed to the chain stores by Borden could also be attributed
to some of the independent grocery stores which purchased in volumes com-
parable to or larger than the chain stores.29 In addition, it appeared that Borden
had assigned certain costs to the independent stores which were not in fact
incurred with respect to all of them. In short, the customer groupings set up
by Borden were not composed of members possessing the requisite "selfsame-
ness" with respect to the essential point or points determining the costs con-
sidered.
In another Borden case,"0 Borden charged higher prices to customers pur-
chasing Borden label milk than to those purchasing private label milk. In de-
fense, Borden asserted that the price differentials were cost justified. Borden's
cost study compared the nationwide, annual average price differentials per case
between Borden label and private label milk. It concluded that the price
differentials in favor of the private label purchasers were more than justified
by cost savings realized in doing business with that class of purchaser. The
Commission rejected the cost study for two fundamental reasons, among others.
In the first place, Borden's use of "broad averaging" distorted the measurement
of the price differentials to be cost justified. The record indicated that the price
differentials which gave rise to competitive injury varied substantially from one
area of the country to another; they also varied to a lesser degree within each
area from time to time throughout the year.3 Therefore, the averaging of prices
on a nationwide annual basis for purposes of the cost study was not a true
reflection of the price differentials at issue, i.e., those causing competitive injury.
Second, the Commission determined that the averaging of costs as to all
Borden label customers as a group and as to all private label customers as a
group was unacceptable in that it resulted in the grouping together of customers
as to which Borden's costs were obviously not substantially the same."2
In American Motors Corp.,"3 American Motors, a manufacturer of electrical
appliances, and its subsidiary sales corporation were charged with violating sec-
28 Id. at 469.
29 Id. at 469-70.
30 Borden Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16191 (F.T.C. Nov. 28, 1962), rev'd on other grounds,
339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 807 (1965).
31 Id. at 21024.
32 Id. at 21025.
33 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17297 (F.T.C. July 19, 1965).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
tion 2(a). The price differentials at issue involved sales through the subsidiary
corporation to "regular" dealers at prices consistently higher than the prices
charged competing retailers designated as "merchandising distributors" on the
purchase of electrical appliances of like grade and quality. American Motors
asserted that the lower prices to the "merchandising distributors" were based
on legitimate cost savings within the meaning of the cost justification proviso.
In the Commission's view, the cost justification defense, as presented, was defec-
tive since American Motors had failed to meet its threshold burden of estab-
lishing a reasonable basis for the classification of its customers.
The unique feature of the American Motors decision was the order to
cease and desist. Under the terms of that order, American Motors must sub-
mit any asserted cost-justified price differentials to the Commission for its ap-
proval at least 60 days prior to their effective date. In addition, the order
requires American Motors to make the basis for these price differentials known
to all of its customers. In the Commission's language, this provision is designed
to facilitate the Commission's ascertainment as to "whether a given customer
was discriminated against or had simply elected not to avail itself of the oppor-
tunity to secure the lower prices."
In conclusion, it may be said that in order to have any real chance of
justifying price differentials based upon differences in costs, a seller must be
very careful in determining the proper criteria to be used in the classification
of its customers; and it must, as a practical matter, do this in advance of charging
the differing prices. The failure of most post facto cost studies can be traced to
a single fundamental handicap - the criteria selected and used for such a purpose,
without the careful advance consideration necessary, have failed to reflect accu-
rately the essential factor or factors which determine the particular costs in
question. In the words of the cost proviso itself, such criteria have failed to
relate to the "differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered."3
34 Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
